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• despite positive effects overall, recent work
shows that these policy instruments are not
effective in repairing existing disparities in
performance by race. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SCHOOL
QUALITY
Much research on how schooling affects indi-
vidual earnings has focused merely on attainment,
or the quantity of schooling, but more-recent
research has turned to issues of quality. This alter-
native focus is consistent with the current attention
policymakers are paying to student testing and
accountability in the United States, United
Kingdom, and elsewhere.1
Recent research in the United States shows that
the quality of schooling relates to real differences
in earnings and attainment. Three recent studies
provide direct and quite consistent estimates of the
S
ince the passage of the No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB), a common question
has been: Is it working? Of course, analyz-
ing the overall impacts of NCLB is diffi-
cult if not impossible. The policies are very recent.
But, more than that, there is no obvious compari-
son group because all states fall under the purview
of NCLB. Nonetheless, because many states had
previously introduced their own accountability
systems—systems that became the heart of most
states’ responses to NCLB—it is possible to exam-
ine these states’ experiences and infer many of the
overall effects of the federal legislation.
This paper presents a nontechnical overview
of the findings of analyses of state accountability.
It summarizes three central results:
• Performance on typical “state accountability”
standardized tests is tied directly to economic
effects; 
• accountability policies in general lead to
higher levels of achievement, though the
magnitudes of the effects are influenced by
the design of the policy; and, 
The introduction of student accountability systems across the United States has been controversial
both because of its focus on standardized achievement tests and because of questions about its
effectiveness. Past evidence, however, shows that performance on standardized tests of the type
central to state accountability systems has powerful economic effects. Additionally, analysis of
performance across states indicates that accountability policies in general lead to higher levels of
achievement, though the magnitudes of the effects are influenced by the design of the policy. Finally,
however, despite positive effects overall, recent work shows that these policy instruments are not
effective at closing the black-white achievement gap.
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1 A more complete discussion of the issues in this section can be
found in Hanushek (2004): www.hanushek.net.
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1999; Murnane et al., 2000; and Lazear, 2003). These
studies use different nationally representative data
sets that follow students after they leave school and
enter the labor force. When scores are standardized,
they suggest that a 1-standard-deviation increase
in mathematics performance at the end of high
school translates into 12 percent higher annual
earnings.2
Figure 1 graphically portrays the impact of
higher quality of schooling: Comparing the median
earnings in 2001 of a typical individual in the
United States with the amount they would earn if
the quality of their schooling had been 1 standard
deviation higher (i.e., if their measured achievement
changed from the 50th percentile to the 84th) shows
that expected earnings shifts upward by some 12
percent each year throughout their working career.
Although the research is less extensive, similar or
larger magnitudes of earnings improvement have
been found in other countries. 
Moreover, although not shown in this figure,
there are additional gains that would accrue because
individuals with greater skills tend to continue
farther in schooling—that is, to have higher school
attainment. Murnane et al. (2000) separate the direct
returns to measured skill from the indirect returns
to more schooling and suggest that perhaps one-
third to one-half of the full return to higher achieve-
ment comes from further schooling. (Figure 1 shows
just the direct effects of skills, not including the
indirect effects from added schooling.) Note also
that the other side of increases in school attainment
from quality improvements is a decrease in school
drop-out rates. Specifically, higher student achieve-
ment keeps students in school longer, which will
lead to, among other things, higher graduation
rates at all levels of schooling. 
Another place to look for the economic impact
of school quality is the effect on the growth in
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Median U.S. Individual Earnings with 1.0 SD Reform
NOTE: SD is standard deviation.
2 Murnane et al. (2000) provide evidence from the “High School and
Beyond” survey and the national longitudinal survey of the high
school class of 1972. Their estimates suggest some variation: male
students obtain a 15 percent increase and female students a 10 percent
increase in earnings per standard deviation of test performance.
Lazear (2003), relying on a somewhat younger sample from the
national education longitudinal study of 1988, provides a single
estimate of 12 percent. These estimates are also very close to those
in Mulligan (1999), who finds 11 percent for the normalized Armed
Forces Qualification Test in the national longitudinal survey of youth
data. By way of comparison, estimates of the value of an additional
year of school attainment are typically 7 to 10 percent.national income. Economists have demonstrated
that productivity gains that are directly related to
human capital fuel increases in the gross domestic
product (GDP) of a nation. GDP growth, in turn, is
what improves the standard of living for its citizens.
Furthermore, the benefits of productivity growth
compound over time, to dramatic effect. With U.S.
economic levels as shown in Figure 2, if the econ-
omy grew by 1 percent per year starting in 2000,
GDP per capita would increase by 65 percent by
2050. Were the economy of the United States to
grow at 2 percent per year, the GDP per capita would
go from roughly $35,000 to over $94,000.
Research on how school quality affects growth
shows that a 1-standard-deviation increase in stu-
dent achievement (moving from the 50th to the 84th
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Improved GDP with Moderately Strong Knowledge Improvementpercentile) translates into 1 percent faster growth
(Hanushek and Kimko, 2000). That is, after allow-
ing for any other factors that might affect growth,
improvements in student outcomes have a very
powerful impact on growth, leading to the kind of
gains found in Figure 2.
The pattern of economic effects depends on
two factors: the size of achievement gains and the
speed with which they are obtained. The faster the
United States introduces quality-oriented educa-
tion reforms, the faster it will be able to realize the
benefits offered by such an approach. Consider
the effects of achieving a moderately strong gain
in knowledge, as measured by moving from the
median to the 69th percentile (i.e., 0.5 standard
deviations) over differing time horizons. Figure 3
illustrates the impact on the level of GDP arising
from moderately strong gains in knowledge over
10-, 20- and 30-year time frames. If it takes 30 years
to achieve that level of improvement, the GDP in
2040 will be approximately 4 percent higher than
it otherwise would be. This gain in GDP would
essentially pay for all primary and secondary expen-
ditures. In other words, the growth dividend from
true reforms that led to real student achievement
gains would make schooling free. If those quality
gains can be realized in 20 years, then the com-
pounding is more pronounced and 2040 GDP will
be greater by 5 percent. With a 10-year horizon for
improvement, the GDP gain in 2040 will be nearly
7 percent. Reaching higher achievement levels in
a shorter period of time is clearly more difficult,
but it yields compensating gains.
RESOURCE RICH, RESULTS POOR
Despite decades of effort, no resource-oriented
policies have achieved results that are as significant
as those described here. The evidence is consistent
across many countries—in the United States and
foreign nations, in developed countries and devel-
oping ones—that “throwing money at schools” does
not result in improvements (see Hanushek, 2003).
We have learned this lesson with difficulty in
the United States. We have witnessed large growth
in teacher investments, as measured by the share
of teachers with Master’s degrees and decreased
pupil-teacher ratios. We have more experienced—
and thus more highly paid—teachers than in past
decades. And perhaps most dramatically, we have
tripled our average real per-pupil spending since
1960.
Hanushek and Raymond
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National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), Age 17But the rewards are slim to none. As shown in
Figure 4, U.S. performance on the National Assess-
ment of Educational Progress (NAEP) has gained
only slightly in reading and math and has actually
declined in science and writing. This is hardly a
sterling endorsement for increasing spending further.
The international picture is similarly unsup-
portive. If resources were significantly and posi-
tively related to performance, one would expect
to see that countries who scored the highest in the
Trends in International Math and Science Study
(TIMSS) would spend the most and that lower-
performing countries would spend less. However,
as laid out in Figure 5, which ranks countries by
TIMSS performance, no such pattern exists. Of note,
the United States is among the countries with the
highest expenditures but ranks near the middle in
terms of performance.
FOCUS ON ACCOUNTABILITY
Over the past decade, a sea change has occurred
in the design of education policies in many coun-
tries around the globe.3 Policies have shifted from
attending to inputs and processes to a focus on the
outcomes realized by students. The change has
emerged through the widening practice of testing
students against a common set of expectations about
learning objectives for each grade. Thus, standards,
testing, and accountability go hand in hand.
Where countries have a single education admin-
istration, as in Taiwan or the United Kingdom,
students often face national exams. Countries with
federal systems of government in which education
is a federal responsibility operate in similar ways.
In the United States, the responsibility for educa-
tion resides in the 50 individual states. Over the
past 10 years, states have adopted their own poli-
cies at different times, which created a diversity
of accountability policies and testing programs as
well as different adoption dates. States differed
also in the use of rewards and sanctions. Figure 6
3 The explicit modeling of accountability is fully developed in
Hanushek and Raymond (2005). This section relies on the results in
that study.
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TIMSS Performance and Spending (Countries Ranked by TIMSS Aggregates)shows the pattern of the adoption of accountability
systems by states. It also shows the division between
“report card” states (those simply reporting results
to the population) and “consequential” states (those
attaching varying rewards and sanctions to school
performance).
Not surprisingly, the adoption of accountability
policies has produced a range of education outcomes
as well.
The closest thing to a national examination in
the United States is the NAEP. The program is
designed to test a representative sample of students
in 4th, 8th, and 12th grades in reading, mathematics,
science, and other subjects regularly. Starting in
1992, the methods used to select student samples
were intended to provide representative results at
the state level. Participation, until recently, was
voluntary for individual states, so states could test
in only one subject or restrict the grades that were
tested. Still, it is the only available common meas-
ure of performance across states.
In recognition of the heterogeneity of student
results, the U.S. Congress in 2001 passed sweeping
education reform legislation, the No Child Left
Behind Act. Although not completely standardized,
NCLB pushes toward a common practice on
accountability throughout the United States.
Although the law respects the states’ rights to design
both education policies and standards/testing poli-
cies, it requires each system to test students annu-
ally, requires all states to report on a limited set of
performance metrics, and introduces a common
set of consequences for schools that fail to show
acceptable results. The policy also requires states
to establish their own standards of proficiency using
their state standardized test, though the actual
thresholds of “below proficient” and “proficient”
may differ across states. 
We are able to capitalize on the staggered adop-
tion and diversity of accountability programs to
study in a general way the effect of this important
change on student performance. (Clearly, the NCLB
has equalized the program characteristics and, thus,
has ended the national accountability experiment
of state-level differences.) Combined with the
periodic scores reported on NAEP tests, which were
given every four years throughout our evaluation
period, three research questions can be addressed:
• Does accountability work?
• Are the impacts common for all subgroups?
• Are there policy attributes that affect results?
It is important to note that the analysis is limited
in several respects. Some states did not adopt an
accountability system at all until required by NCLB,
thus limiting the observations of accountability
effects. Second, state participation in NAEP is vol-
untary; so, even among those states with account-
ability policies, data were lacking for some grades
in some years. States also differed in their decisions
to exclude students on the basis of disability, lan-
guage proficiency, or time since entry into a school
from taking the test; accordingly, there is some mix-
ing of students across states and over time within
states. Finally, accountability was not the only
reform initiative that states implemented over the
study period, but the impacts of these other initia-
tives are difficult to isolate.
How Well Do Accountability Systems
Work?
Accountability policies have two general char-
acteristics: They provide performance information
about a school in a consistent way, and they require
all schools to face similar treatment based on their
results. States create an aggregate score for each
school based on individual student test scores.
Because states differ in the way they measure school
performance, they may send different signals to
schools and, ultimately, promote different policy
results. Our basic assessment of existing account-
ability systems does not distinguish among design
features of different states, although later we suggest
that the designs are very different and are likely to
affect performance more or less strongly. The school
score is then used to determine the performance
of schools against some pre-set criteria. These eval-
uative ratings are intended to provide feedback and
offer objective motivation to spur improvement.
Second, what happens to schools once they obtain
their scores differs by state. As noted previously,
some states merely make the information public
(known as report card states), whereas others intro-
duce consequences in the form of rewards and/or
sanctions. The current analysis looks at the impact
of having consequences to test whether the design
Hanushek and Raymond
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matter. We return later to issues of overall design.
Conditional Consequences. Accountability
programs differ in how they use accountability
scores, and such differences may influence the
effectiveness of the program. Earlier research iden-
tified two general approaches. The first uses public
disclosure to motivate interested parents, school
boards, the media, and civic leaders to demand
better performance from low-scoring schools.
This approach relies on release of scores over the
Internet and publication and comment in local
papers. The second and more direct approach
incorporates into the accountability program’s
design a set of consequences—typically monetary
awards, Blue Ribbon designations, or punitive
actions such as probationary status or threat of
reconstitution—to prompt schools to improve.
As shown in Figure 6, between 1993 and 2002,
43 states adopted accountability programs. Of these,
29 programs included consequences and 14 used
a report card approach. The markedly different
mechanisms of influence provide the chance to
study whether this design feature is influential in
the educational improvement of states. Considera-
tion of the type of accountability system was incor-
porated into the overall test of the effectiveness of
accountability to which our discussion now turns. 
Modeling the Effectiveness of Accountability.
The availability of NAEP test results on repeated
administrations of the test provides a unique oppor-
tunity to examine the staggered adoption of account-
ability policies across the states and to test their
impact on the rate of improvement in student aca-
demic achievement. Conveniently, NAEP tests
students in the 4th and 8th grades in reading and
math every four years; so, for states that test students
in both grades, over time the same cohort is cap-
tured as it moves through school.
For both reading and math, we can test the
progress of two cohorts of students in states partici-
pating in the NAEP. As noted in Figure 6, we can
use 8th grade math scores in 1996 and 2000 and
reading scores in 1998 and 2002 (combined with
4th grade scores four years prior). As long as we
can control for cohort differences in family back-
ground (e.g., parental education, race/ethnicity,
poverty), average state education spending, and
testing exclusions over the period, the growth in
achievement across cohorts can be compared for
Hanushek and Raymond
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State Accountability Over Time
NOTE: Gray bars indicate NAEP testing dates.states that had adopted accountability over the
period of study against states that did not. We fur-
ther exploit the disaggregation of NAEP results by
race and ethnicity (white, black, and Hispanic).
We pool the disaggregated state test data for both
reading and math. 
We also consider the difference in the system
design (consequence vs. report card) and a fixed-
state effect to reflect any other policy changes that
the state might have adopted to improve student
performance. Multivariate econometric modeling
was used to discern the impacts of the factors we
examined. (The full models estimated are reported
in Table A1 of the appendix.)
The overall difference in performance between
4th and 8th grades that comes from accountability
is displayed in Figure 7. For each group of students,
the expected growth in achievement is higher in
states that implement accountability systems than
in states that do not. 
The improvement was realized by states that
attached consequences to schools’ performance.
However, states with “report card” accountability
programs had no significantly different achievement
levels from those of states without any accounta-
bility program.
Other results are also noteworthy. Testing exclu-
sion rules were negatively significant—the more
students excluded, the better the results; nonethe-
less, exclusion rates vary across states in a way
that does not affect the estimated importance of
accountability. Differences in per-pupil spending
were not significant in explaining the differences
in learning gains. This latter finding is consistent
with a large body of earlier work; in this case, the
finding provides especially important insight
because many states face pressure to dramatically
increase spending to promote better learning.
At the same time, by comparing the gains for
each group, it is clear that accountability has differ-
ent impacts on the groups. The overall differences
are shown in Figure 8, which identifies the black-
white and Hispanic-white achievement gaps both
with and without accountability. The comparisons
(measured in standard deviation units) show that
accountability closes the gap for Hispanics but
widens it for blacks.
DESIGN ISSUES
Although each adopted its accountability system
independently, states copied student testing and
school scoring design from each other.4 Although
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Figure 7
Effect of Consequential Accountability on Achievement by Race/Ethnicity
4 A more complete discussion of these design issues is found in
Hanushek, Raymond, and Rivkin (2004).small distinctions arose, the systems fall into a few
groups; the differences provided the chance to
examine the design features of these systems and
learn whether they influence the effectiveness of
accountability as a policy. We found that design
does matter: The results that states obtain can be
markedly different based only on the approach
they use.
School Scores
We begin by looking at the individual student
test score. We know that the score a student receives
on an achievement test is influenced by multiple
factors: earlier learning, family background, test
measurement error, and the actual contribution of
his schooling in the year tested. But a test score at
one point in time captures the effect of all these,
not simply that of the school.
Depending on the method of aggregating a
school score from student-level scores, the school
score also captures these other factors to varying
extents. Simple averages of annual test scores pro-
duce results that can differ over time simply because
of changes in the student population, a real problem
in schools with high student mobility rates. Purer
results are obtained when school scores aggregate
the gain scores for individual students over time
(that is, the improvements in their scores); the influ-
ences of family background and prior learning tend
Hanushek and Raymond












Racial/Ethnic Gaps by Consequential Accountability Status: NAEP Gains Relative to White Students
Table 1
Simple Correlation of Alternative School Accountability Measures: TAAS Math for Grades 5 and 6
Average score Average gain Relative gain 
Average score  1.00
Average gain  0.27 1.00
Relative gain  0.67 0.86 1.00
NOTE: Correlations are weighted by the number of students in each school. These data exclude all students moving into school during the
year plus those eligible for special education or bilingual programs. Each measure is calculated for individual grades and then aggregated
to the school level.to disappear when these scores are used. Still, the
magnitude of gains may depend on the starting
point—low-performing students may achieve
higher gains than high-performing ones—so com-
parison across schools may be problematic. For this
reason, a third method (not currently in use but
valuable for comparison purposes) examines gains
relative to other like-situated schools. We refer to
this approach as the relative gain score. 
To gauge the effects that program design has on
school scores, we compute then compare the rank-
ings of schools over the same set of student scores.
The student scores from the Texas Assessment of
Academic Skills (TAAS) test for 5th and 6th graders
for over 1000 schools were used. If no difference in
the computational methods existed, the correlations
of school ranks should be unitary. The correlation
results are shown in Table 1. The low correlation
of the simple average and gain scores, at 0.27, is
particularly troublesome since these are the two
methods most widely used in the United States
today. Even more troubling is the finding that the
different rankings result in many schools moving
from the top quartile to the bottom and vice versa,
completely reversing the signal about the effective-
ness of the school. Better alignment is seen between
the other comparisons, which may suggest new
options for calculating scores. It is difficult to
judge the success of national reform programs if
the outcome metrics used in those inquiries are so
unrelated.
CONCLUSIONS
Improving educational quality has a dramatic
effect on the economic well-being of individuals
and nations. The original research described here
reinforces the idea that public policies can posi-
tively affect the course of education quality. The
findings demonstrate that, overall, the adoption of
accountability policies produces higher academic
gains than having no policy, but that the impacts
are not equally distributed across all student groups.
We also find that the designs of the systems them-
selves must receive careful attention so that con-
sistent and accurate information about school
performance can be obtained. 
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APPENDIX
Table A1
Differential Racial and Ethnic Impact of Accountability on State Growth in NAEP Reading and
Mathematics Performance (4th to 8th Grade), 1992-2002
Disaggregation of 
Accountability by ethnicity state accountability
Consequential accountability 3.40 (2.8)** 3.54 (3.0)**
Consequential accountability x black –2.04 (2.0)*
Consequential accountability x Hispanic 3.10 (2.4)*
Disaggregated x Hispanic –2.35 (2.0)*
Disaggregated x black 3.02 (2.0)*
Report card system  0.72 (0.6) 0.72 (0.6)
(%Population age 25+)  high school 0.05 (0.7) 0.06 (0.9)
School spending, $/ADM ($1000) –1.14 (0.6) –1.07 (0.6)
Change in exclusion rates 0.50 (3.5)** 0.51 (3.5)**
Black –6.34 (2.5)* –6.76 (2.6)**
Hispanic  –10.17 (4.4)** –9.80 (4.2)**
Minority exposure x black –8.59 (2.7)** –8.16 (2.4)*
Minority exposure x Hispanic –4.90 (1.4) –4.98 (1.4)
Observations 348 348
Number of states 42 42
R2 0.956 0.956
NOTE: */** Indicates significance at the 5/1 percent levels. All models are estimated with state fixed effects. Models include NAEP 4th
grade scores for reading and math (lagged four years) and indicator variables for test and period. Absolute value of robust t statistics (with
clustering by state) in parentheses.